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CONDITIONAL REMAINDERMAN---BEWAREI
MARYHELEN WIGLE.
If the tax on transfer at death of anticipatory estates levied by the

Sovereign State of Washington is imposed upon their inheritance, and
is payable by the beneficiary on his future as distinguished from his
possessory interest, a legatee or devisee of a conditional 2 remainder
may find himself paying handsomely for the mere privilege of having
been remembered by the testator in his wilP--a somewhat ephemeral
consideration, to put it mildly.
The purpose of this article is to examine our Inheritance Tax laws
with the object of determining (a) whether the tax is imposed upon
the remainderman's legacy,4 and, if so, (b) upon what evaluation such
tax on conditional remainders is payable.
For, if the tax is not levied against the inheritance nor payable by
the beneficiary, but is only a charge against the decedent's estate, the
remainderman will not be out of pocket at least,5 however nebulous
the bequest. Nor can he complain if a tax is exacted from him on
the basis of his real rather than his fictional interest-that is, when
it is determined what of value he will acquire, if anything. But if he
must pay for a pig in a poke without assurance that a pig of any kind
exists, then blessed indeed is he who expecteth nothing!
Of course, not all remainders are equally dubious legacies. For
example, if T devises Blackacre to A for a term of years with remainder to B in fee, or to A for life with remainder to B in fee, the
'A remainder is any future interest limited in favor of a transferee in
such manner that it can become a- present interest upon the expiration of
all prior interests simultaneously created, and cannot divest any interest
except an interest left in the transferor. RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY (1936)
§ 156.
2
The term "conditional remainder" as used in this text includes all
remainder interests not indefeasibly vested. See Note on Terminology,
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 157.
3
The term "will" as used in this text includes any instrument or
other method effecting a property transfer which is subject to tax under
REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11201 et seq., as made in contemplation of,
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death
of the transferor; the term "testator" includes any such transferor.
'The term "legacy" as used in- this text includes any property which
is the subject matter of a transfer taxable under REm. REV. STAT. (Supp.
1939) § 11201 et seq., as made in contemplation of, or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the transferor.
"As a practical matter, where the value of the interests are known,
heirs and distributees commonly apportion a tax which is against decedent's estate, among themselves in proportion to their interests. There is
no" personal liability for the tax in individual transferees. Higley v.
Com'r. Int. Rev., 69 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
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interest which vests in B at T's death is certain eventually to ripen
into beneficial enjoyment of the property in its entirety. There is no
uncertainty here; the term is sure to end, and the fact of A's death is
equally definite. Of death and taxes can we at least be certain. True,
B runs some risk of damage to or depletion of the property during the
preceding estate, as well as its depreciation. 6 But his interest in Blackacre can in no way be defeated; the quantum of that interest cannot
be abridged. Only the value of the property itself can change.7
A conditional remainder, however, has no such certainty-it may be
contingent or defeasible, in whole or in part." Thus:
1. It may be vested subject to open. If T devises Backacre to A
for life, remainder to the sons of A, immediately on T's death B, as A's
only son, has the remainder interest in Blackacre. But that estate is
subject to reduction in quantum if other male children are subsequently born to A. Here the interest itself is certain, but its extent
uncertain.
2. Or the remainder may be contingent-that is, subject to a condition precedent. If T devises Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B
if, but only if B shall attain the age of twenty-one, B's interest in Blackacre depends entirely upon his ever arriving at that age.
3. Though vesting immediately, the remainder may be subject to
complete defeasance. Thus if T devises Blackacre to A for life, remainder as A shall by will appoint, but in default of and until such
appointment, to B, B's remainder interest in the property can be cut
off absolutely by A's exercise of the power conferred upon him.
Only slightly less a gamble is B's remainder interest in Blackacre
subject to a life estate in A with power in A to dispose of the property
and use the proceeds for support during his lifetime. This remainder
may be reduced in quantum to complete defeasance. And where the
power in A to invade the corpus is unlimited as to purpose, B's chances
of eventual enjoyment of the property are even slimmer.
It is with taxation of devolution of such uncertain interests as these
6 But the life tenant has an enforceable duty to subsequent interests
not to diminish the value of the estate by volitional or negligent conduct.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936)
§ 187 et. seq.
7 This is an indefeasibly vested remainder. See note 8, infra.
I "A remainder can be (a) indefeasibly vested; or (b) vested subject
to open; or (c) vested subject to complete defeasance; or (d) subject to
a condition precedent.
"The term 'vested remainder' designates, generically, remainders of the
three categories enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c). The term 'contingent remainder' is frequently used to designate a remainder subject
to a condition precedent . . . [but] has been used too frequently in a
loose manner to designate any remainder involving an uncertainty. It
has thus become uncertain as to its exact meaning when used.
"Stress upon the distinction between 'contingent' remainders and other
remainders (generically described as 'vested'), and failure sufficiently to
note the difference between the two categories enumerated in Clauses

(a) to (c)
RESTATEMENT,

inclusive have caused substantial confusion in the law."
PROPERTY (1936)
§ 157 and Note on Terminology.
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that we are here concerned.
Throughout this discussion it is essential to keep in mind certain
elementary but very fundamental principles of law. The first of these
is that no person has the right to control the disposition of his property
after death, nor correlatively, is there any inherent right to acquire
property by inheritance. Both are done only by permission of the
sovereign state.9 Like the privilege of doing business in corporate form,
the grant is one which can be summarily revoked. Ipso facto, it can
be altered, restricted, and conditioned. And manifestly one of the conditions may be exaction of a toll for the public use.10
The second of these is that, being incidental to the grant,- the tax
may be levied in any manner and upon any theory the legislative body
determines. It may be imposed upon exercise of the privilege of transmitting the property from dead to living; 1 it may be imposed upon
result of such exercise, that is, upon the privilege of inheriting.12 It
may constitutionally be a combination of both."2 The theory upon
which the tax is levied is of vital importance in the construction and
operation of the particular taxing act. But so far as, the power of the
state to make the charge is concerned, it is quite immaterial.
The third of these is that, being a price put upon exercise of a right
conferred, it is an excise tax, although it may be measured by the
value of the property the ownership of which is suspended: by death,
or by the extent of the interest transferred or received.'- Accordingly,
it is not subject to constitutional or statutory restrictions applicable
to property or other direct taxation. 5 The rate may vary with the value
of the interest received, and with the relationship of transferor to. transferee.'6 It may be graduated in proportion to the extent of the interest
to which death has put a period without reference to beneficiary.' 7
The tax may operate retroactively if the statute evidences a clear
intention of the legislative body that it shall do so.' 8 The effect of its
9
In re McGrath's Estate, 191 Wash. 496, 71 P. (2d) 395 (1937); In re
Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922); Estate of Wilmerding, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 181 (1897); In re Hooker's Estate, 173 Misc. 515,
18 N.
Y. S. (2d) 107 (1940).
0
1n re Fotheringham's Estate, 183 Wash. 579, 49 P. (2d) 480 (1935).
11 Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924); Central Trust Co. v. James,
120 W. Va. 611, 199 S. E. 881. (1938).
22 State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439 71 Pac. 20 (1902); Estate of Amller, 184
Cal. 674, 195 Pac. 413, 16AL L. R. 694 .(1921).
"In re Henry's Estate, 189 Wash. 510; 66, P. (2d) 350 (1937Y; State v.
Eldodt. 33 N. M. 347, 267 Pac. 55 (1928)._
"In re McGrath's Estate, supra note 9; Estate of' Elston, 32 Cal. Ap.
(2d) 652, 90 P. (2d) 608 (1939); Kelso v. Sargeant, l Cal. Ap. (2d), 170,
54, P. (2d)- 26 (1936).
1In-re Ellis' Estate,. 169 Wash. 581, 14 P. (2d) 37 (1932);, State v. Clark,
30 Wash. 439, 71 Pac. 20 (1902).
IC Estate of Rath, 10 Cal. (2d) 399, 75 P. (2d) 509, 115 A. L.R. 836 (1937,)-...
7
7Schuette v. Bowers, 40 F. (2d)" 208, (C. C. A. 2d, 1930)..
l, In re Colenan's Estate; 196 Wash. 295, 82, P.. (2d) 795! (1938).; Inre
Ward's Estate, 183 Wash. 604, 49 P. (2d> 485- (1935)-.
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imposition may be highly discriminatory in fact, so long as there is
equal application in identical circumstances.19 The citizen must take
the privilege as he finds it, provided the toll exacted is not confiscation
20
in the guise of taxation.
The last generality to be borne in mind is that a court must look
for determination of the exactions upon exercise of the privilege to
the statutes of the jurisdiction to which taxpayer or property is subject,
and must be guided primarily, if not exclusively, by their language;
it cannot be overemphasized that taxation is a field of purely positive
law. The United States Supreme Court decisions must be examined,
of course, for limitations imposed upon the states by the Federal Constitution. But even the case law of the particular sovereign imposing
the tax should be viewed with constant suspicion, lest it be nullified
as authority by reason of changes in the statutory law.
Quite generally the scope and meaning of an inheritance tax statute
is found in its past. The best approach to construction after the language of the act itself is a comparative study of its development.2 '
For, unlike Mark Twain's lament anent the weather, legislatures not
only talk about taxes in general, and inheritance taxes in particularthey do something about them constantly. Each session of every
legislature finds additions, deletions, changes in nomenclature, definition or theory, designed to block some loophole, rectify some injustice,
or correct some error which administration or interpretation of the
existing law may have disclosed. And subject only to constitutional
limitations, the court is, of course, bound by the intent of the legislature, its duty being but to ascertain that intent and to give it effect.
Reflection on these general principles makes it evident we are not
here questioning, nor can we question, the power of the State of Washington to tax the devolution of remainder interests, straight 22 or conditional, in any manner its legislature disposes. The problem is how
does it deal with and to what extent does the law consider the uncertainties of the conditional remainderman's bequest in imposing the
tax.

A.

Is THE TAX IMPOSED UPON THE REMAINDERMAN'S LEGACY?

The answer to this inquiry depends upon a further question-on
what theory does this state tax the transfer of ownership from the dead
to the living? Is the levy death duty or succession tax?
If it is the first, the tax is imposed not on the remainderman's legacy,
but on the estate of the transferor. For a death duty or estate tax is an
exaction upon the privilege of transmission of property by the decedent, and is concerned only with the interest which death has ended.
"In re Henry's Estate, supra note 13; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137
(1925).
"-Danev. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589 (1921).
21 In re Lindholm's Estate, 6 Wn. (2d) 366, 107 P. (2d) 562 (1940).
22 A remainder indefeasibly vesting.
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That the transfer will result after payment of the tax in the creation
of certain interests is quite immaterial. A death duty takes no cognizance of who the heir or distributee is, or the quantum of his inheritance. It is of no importance whatsoever to imposition of the
tax that he shall inherit anything except in the sense that inheritance
is necessarily the result of transfer.
The tax collector does not look to the heir or distributee for payment
of such part of a death duty as his interest bears to the whole of the
property which is the subject of decedent's transfer. The jurisdiction
levying an estate tax looks to the whole of the property and demands
payment of the executor.23 The tax as an entirety is a debt due from
the estate.

24

But if it is the second, the tax is imposed upon the remainderman's
legacy, for a succession or inheritance tax is a levy upon receipt of
property from the decedent. Since it is concerned with the interest
newly created by death, a succession tax is charged upon the interest
of each heir or distributee, whatever that interest may be; 2" and in
the absence of statutory lien and, other provisions directed toward
collection of the tax upon all interests, 26 the tax collector looks to
27
him for payment of the tax on his own.
The statute of this state is designated "Inheritance Tax," but, while
the name of the act may be of some assistance in deciding upon which
theory the tax is levied, alone it is not conclusive nor even very significant. The term "inheritance" is loosely used to include both types
of taxation. We must determine, if we can, whether the Act taxes
transfer primarily, or receipt.
The, test is what factors are involved in determination of the applicable rate. Is it based on the value of decedent's estate? Or prescribed in terms of the identity of beneficiary and the value of his
interest? If, before it can be determined what rate shall apply, it is
23 Edwards v. Slocum, 287 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923): ai'd. 264 U. S. 61
(1924); Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (W. D. La. 1921); In re Smith's
Estate, 147 Misc. 73, 264 N. Y. Supp. 431 (1933); In re Oakes, 248 N. Y 280,
162 N. E. 79 (1928); 28 Am. JuR. 8.
2
, Estate of Elston, supra note 14. It is in the nature of an administra-'
tive expense, not a charge against the legatees. Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83
F. (2d) 566 (App. D. C. 1936); Wellington v. Hamlin, 185 App. Div. 153,
172 N. Y. Supp. 787 (1918).
2
5Walla Walla v. State, 197 Wash. 357, 85 P. (2d) 676, 65 A. L. R. 1379
(1938); 28 Mv. Jun. 8.
2
-6"The
inheritance tax shall be and remain a lien on such estate from
the death of the decedent until paid: ..." WAsH. LAws 1937, c. 106, § 1;
Rsm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11201. For liability of the representative
of the estate, see WASH. LAWS 1939, c. 202, § 3; REm. Rzv. STAT. (Supp.
1939) § 11202-in. Similar provisions looking to collection of the tax on all
interests are quite general in inheritance tax laws, but of course the
.court cannot compel one legatee to pay the inheritance tax due from
another. In T'e Clark's Estate, 37 Wash. 671, 80 Pac. 267 (1905).
27 In re Ferguson's Estate, 113 Wash. 598, 194 Pac. 771 (1921).; Estate
of Miller, supra note 12.
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necessary to ascertain the relationship of benefactor to beneficiary,
and to evaluate the property the transferee receives, the tax is upon
receipt. If, however, to fix the tax, all that is prima facie required is
to ascertain the value of the property which is the subject of transmittal by decedent, and apply the rate prescribed on such value, the
28
tax is upon transfer.
Of course, from death duties deductions may be allowed, for bequests to charity for example. 29 In such case it will be necessary to
determine the extent of the interest to which the beneficiary is entitled
for which the deduction is claimed. Estate tax exemptions may also
be authorized in amounts varying with the degree of consanguity between transferor and recipient, 0 in which case it will be necessary not
only to determine the extent of the interest to which the beneficiary is
entitled for which exemption is claimed, but also his relationship to
the decedent.
These determinations are required, however, not to fix the rate of
tax applicable to the interest received, but to ascertain the taxable
value of decedent's estate. An exemption or deduction from a death
duty reduces the estate subject to tax by the amount authorized; it
affects the rates only insofar as it may vary with the net value of all
property which is the subject of decedent's transfer. 21 And this being
so, where the statute refers to heirs and distributees and the value
of their interests in terms not of rate but of exemption or deduction
only, the levy is made not upon receipt of the property or any part of
the property but upon the transfer of the whole. Contrarily, where
such reference is an integral part of the rate structure, we are likely
32
dealing with a succession tax.
We look now to the language of the Washington statute pertaining
to rate.2 3 It reads:
"An inheritance tax shall be imposed on all estates subject to this act . . . at the following rates: Class A. Any
devise, bequest, legacy, gift or beneficial interest to any
property or income, therefrom which shall pass to any grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, husband, wife, child, or
stepchild, adopted child, or lineal descendant of the deceased
29In re Corbin's Estate, 107 Wash. 424, 181 Pac. 910 (1919); Liebman v.
Fontenot, supra note 23; In re Rothfeld's Estate, 163 Misc. 11, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 320 (1937); In re Smith's Estate, 246 App. Div. 99, 285 N. Y. Supp.
109 (1936); In re Curtis' Estate, 142 N. Y. 219, 36 N. E. 887 (1894); Central
Trust Co. v. James, supra note 11.
29 Humes v. U. S., 276 U. S. 487 (1928).
30In re Chollet's Estate, 148 Misc. 782, 266 N. Y. Supp. 415 (1933).
31107 A. L. R. 801, 802.
32In re Corbin's Estate, supra note 28; Stebbins v. Riley, supra note
19; In re Rothfeld's Estate. supra note 28; In re Smith's Estate, 147 Misc.
73, 264 N. Y. Supp. 431' (1933).
33

WASH. LAWS 1939, c. 202, § 1; Rvr. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939)Y § 11202.

Italics supplied.
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is hereby denominated as Class A. On any amount passing
to Class A up to and including $25,000, 1%; on any amount
in excess of $25,000 up to and including $50,000, 2%; on
any amount in excess of $50,000 up to and including $100,000,
4%; on any amount in excess of $100,000 up to and including $200,000, 7%; on any amount in excess of $200,000 up
to and including $500,000, 9%; on any amount in excess of
$500,000, 10%; Provided, That . . . there shall be exempt

$10,000 of any amount passing to Class A...."
The section continues by designating brothers and sisters of decedent
as Class B, establishing the rate of tax on varying amounts passing
to that class and granting a $1,000 exemption in terms similar to the
grant in favor of Class A. It then provides:
"Class C. Any inheritance . . . or beneficial interest to
any property . . .which shall pass to any person . . . other

than mentioned in Class A and Class B herein, is hereby
denominated Class C. On any amount passing to Class C up
to and including $10,000, 10% ...."

The section concludes with the following words:
"The taxes imposed and the exemption with respect to each
class shall be apportioned between the beneficiaries in such
class in proportion to the amount receivable by each."

What have we here-death duty or succession? Can the tax be
fixed solely by ascertaining the value of all the property which is the
subject of transfer by decedent, and applying the rate prescribed on
such value, less authorized deductions and exemptions? Obviously
not, for there is no rate thus prescribed. However, neither is the
rate based exclusively upon the value of the interest and the relation
to the transferor of each heir or distributee, separately considered. His
interest is added to the interests of all others in the defined class of
which he is a member, and the rate is determined by the value of the
sum of those interests.3 '
Is it nevertheless essential to fix the relationship to transferor of
individual transferee, before the tax can be imposed? Is it necessary
to evaluate the interest of each beneficiary? The favoritism shown
members of Classes A and B is not expressed in terms of exemption,
to the estate-reduction in taxable value-but in terms of rate differentiation itself. But the statute provides for lumping all beneficiaries
other than those defined as Class A and Class B into a group, C, and
assessing the total property passing to them at rates dependent upon
the value of the whole; and it may be argued therefrom that the legislature intended to place differentiation in treatment of members of
the first two classes upon an exemption basis-thus beginning with
imposition of the, tax at Class, C rates. upon, decedent's entire estate.
If such- was -the: purpose, it is certainly expressed most oddly, ant
"' itre Lindholm's Estate, supra-note 21; In,re Henry's Estate, supra
note 19.
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the intended result reached with great circuity. It would have been
easy indeed to impose the tax in terms of net value of decedent's estate
instead of the value of particular, or rather aggregate, bequests; and
to favor certain beneficiaries in terms of exemption, instead of making
their relationship to the transferor a fundamental part of the rate
structure.
Certainly the legislature understood the meaning and operation of
exemptions, for it granted them in favor of certain charitable and
religious bequests-although not in terms of reduction in taxable value
of the estate, but expressly to the beneficiaries, again indicative of
succession tax exaction."
That such was not the legislative intention, however, seems apparent
from the mandate contained in the section pertaining to rate, that
the taxes imposed with respect to each class shall be apportioned between the beneficiaries in such class in proportion to the amount
receivable by such beneficiaries. If, in fixing the rate upon the sum
of the interests passing to a class, the legislature actually intended the
tax to be upon transfer and not upon inheritance, this is again a most
curious provision. If a tax is a death duty, it is a charge against
and payable from the residuary, unless otherwise specified in the will,
like any debt against or administration expense of the estate. 6 Are
such items ordinarily apportionable among the beneficiaries?
The United States, for example, does not care who ultimately bears
the weight of its estate tax. Even deductible items are not relieved
from being drawn upon to pay the tax imposed on the taxable portion
of the estate.3 7 If there is any sharing of the burden, it is a matter
for the legatees and devisees to determine among themselves."
The federal government does make provision for reimbursement to
a beneficiary paying the tax from any part of the estate left undistributed, or by equitable contribution from the persons whose interest
in the estate is subject to equal or prior liability for such payment.3 9
But this is the nearest it comes to apportionment, or, for that matter,
to any inquiry as to identity of the recipients or the quantum of their
interests, except for exemption purposes or postponement of payment
of the tax when imposed.

40

WASH. LAWS 1941, c. 197, § 11; ibid. c. 197, § 12.
' 0 Hepburn v. Winthrop. supra note 24; Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees
of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471, 200 Atl. 786, 117 A. L. R. 1186 (1938).
37Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, supra note 11.
38 Edwards v. Slocum, supra note 23.
30 44 Stat. 79 (1926); 26 U. S. C. A. § 426.
40 The federal law provides for extension of time for payment of the
part of the tax attributable to a remainder or reversionary interest at the
election of the executor, under certain conditions. 53 Stat. 140 (1939);
26 U. S. C. A. §§ 525-527. But of course this is subsequent to imposition of
the tax upon the estate as an entirety, and the postponement is under such
regulations and conditions as the Commissioner and Secretary of Treasury
may prescribe.
35
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But if any tax the State of Washington exacts must be apportioned,
then we are not looking at a tax imposed on an estate. Under the terms
of the statute, necessarily the tax must be imposed, in the sense that it
must be computed, before it can be apportioned; but if every beneficiary
is entitled to have the tax upon his interest segregated as a matter of
right, we are still surveying a levy which looks to receipt, and to the
interest of each beneficiary separately considered, even if his interest
is added to the interests of others for the purpose of determining how
much he shall pay. To 'append an apportionment provision even to
a law which in terms taxes net value is to render negligible, in opera41
tion at least, the difference between the two theories of taxation.
How peculiar also, if the purpose was to levy a death duty, to provide in this same section for apportionment of exemptions with respect to each class among beneficiaries of that class, according to individual interests. For exemptions are a credit to, as-the tax is a
42
charge against, the estate itself; under estate tax theory.
If the purpose of the apportionment provision was to insure that
the burden should rest on each beneficiary in accordance with his interest, as seems to follow from the fact that this is the necessary result
of its operation, then we submit the statute does not contemplate a
prima facie levy upon the entire estate at Class C rates with exemptions to classes A and B, but a levy upon each interest received,
although it is combined with others to fix the amount each shall pay.
Considering this section of the statute in its entirety, the legislative
purpose seems to be only to impose a succession tax computed by a
method which will result in bringing inheritances into higher tax
brackets.
There are other indications in the Act that the tax is an impost on
succession. The same legislature which in 1935 established the present
rate method, left on the statute books provision that representatives
of the estate should collect the inheritance tax on any property subject
thereto from the person entitled to the property. This is, of course,
indicative of the theory of a tax on receipt. It also retained provision
that the amount of federal estate tax paid by the estate should be
deducted as an indebtedness of the estate. Both of these are still part
of our Inheritance Tax Law.43 Failure to allow deduction for federal
" In re Rothfeld's Estate, supra note 28.
,2Ibid. The 1935 legislature included insurance as a taxable item, and
provided for apportionment likewise between beneficiaries, of an exemption "from the total amount of insurance receivable by all beneficiaries
other than the. . . representative of the estate, regardless of the number
of policies" in the sum of $40,000. The provision also expressly made insurance taxable to the person entitled thereto. WASH. LAWS 1935, c. 180, § 115,
amended without change in this respect, WAsi. LAws 1939, c. 202, § 5;
Rmr. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11211-b.
' 8 WASH. LAWS 1901, c. 55, § 11; Rr¢. REv. STAT. § 11209; WASH. LAWS
1931, c. 134, § 1; Rmvr R v. STAT. § 11201-b.
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tax paid in computation of tax due the state has been construed by the
United States Supreme Court as rendering the state tax a death duty,
at least to that extent. 4 4 If the converse of the proposition be evidence,
then retention of this provision in our law would appear to lend some
weight, at least, to its construction as a succession levy.
Before 1935 the Washington tax was an inheritance tax in the strict
sense of the term. The theory of the tax was many times questioned
under successive enactments, and the answer was always the same.
In In re Ferguson's Estate,45 citing numerous Washington cases, the
court said: "We have held, from the first case which had this subject
under examination, that the inheritance tax is not on the estate but
on the right to inherit."
In all of these prior acts, of course, the rate was fixed in terms of
the relationship to the transferor of each transferee, and the value
of his individual interest. There is little doubt that in statutes thus
worded the tax is an impost on succession. 46 Is the theory and operation of the levy altered ipso facto by the fact that A's interest is added
to B's and C's, and the rate prescribed upon the sum of those interests?
Let us, for answer, consider three cases in which our Supreme Court
has construed the theory of the impost under the 1935 and subsequent
laws embodying substantially the same method of rate computation.
The first of these is In re Henry's Estate." There the will contained
specific provision for payment of inheritance and estate taxes out of
the estate. The residuary was left in trust. The court held, inter alia,
that under the terms of the statute the proper method of computing
the tax where the will provided for its payment out of the estate, was
not to compute it upon the amount of the specified legacy, but upon
a sum which, when added to the legacy and the tax taken off, will leave
a balance which is the amount of the bequest.
Our question being what kind of tax does the State of Washington
impose, this case is significant (1) because the court expressly stated
that, although the 1935 Act embodied death duty features, the tax
was still a levy upon the right to receive,48 and (2) because the court
implied that it was still primarily a levy upon the right to receive. An
expression in a will that the tax shall be payable from the estate has
,4Stebbins v. Riley, supra note 19.
" Supra note 27
46 In re Corbin's Estate, supra note 28. For example, the law in effect
immediately prior to the 1935 session of the legislature provided: "The
inheritance tax shall be imposed on all estates subject to this . . . act
at the following rates. If passing to or for the use of a father, mother,
... of the decedent .... the tax shall be one per centum of any value not
exceeding $50,000; .... " etc. WASH. LAWS 1931, c. 134, § 3.
47 Supra note 19.
Is Ibid. at 514, 66 P. (2d) at 352. Speaking of the theory of the tax, the
court said: "Prior to the act of 1935, the inheritance taxes were payable on
the right of the heir or legatee to receive. That act, however, embodied
not only that feature, but a tax upon the estate ....
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no significance, of course, unless in absence of -the provision the beneficiary must bear it. If our tax were now a death duty, it would be
taken from the residuary in the absence of a contrary provision in the
instrument."9
To discuss the statute in the light of the presence of a mandate in
the instrument that it shall be so taken is to recognize that, by expressly providing for apportionment of the tax among the beneficiaries
in each class according to the interests of each, not as a matter of agreement or civil redress among the heirs and distributees, but as a matter
of imposing the tax, the legislature still intended the statute to operate as a levy upon inheritance, and to look to the interest of each
beneficiary, however the tax upon that interest might be computed.
The second of these cases is In re McGrath's Estate.50 Here the
question was whether insurance policies on which the premium was
paid by a corporation, and which were payable to it on the death of
the insured without any right in him to change the beneficiary, were
property subject to tax-a question involving, of course, not what
kind of tax is to be imposed, but whether a tax of any kind can be
levied. However, the court, in deciding proceeds of the policies were
not taxable, said it often had been decided that estate taxes could not
be collected with respect to property unless some right in it was transferred by decedent's death, and that the same principles necessarily
applied to the inheritance tax collected by the state under our Act, for
under either theory of taxation there can be no tax unless there is a
transfer."' Is not this statement ample proof the court did not consider the 1935 Act had fundamentally altered the theory upon which
our tax is imposed?
In this case, moreover, with the two theories of 'taxation and the
difference between them in mind, the court directed particular atten52
tion to denomination of the 1935 Act as an "Inheritance Tax."1
Finally, in In re Lindholm's Estate, 3 the court was confronted with
the question of whether, in computing the inheritance tax, the total
net amount of the estate should be divided into the statutory rate
blocks and the statutory exemptions allowable to persons included
within the class be then deducted from the first block passing to that
class; or whether the exemption should first be deducted from the net
amount of the estate and the residue then be,divided into the statutory blocks.
The court, by adopting the first method, held the exemption was to
the beneficiary, or rather to the beneficiaries, in the defined class,
and not a grant to the estate of a reduction in net taxable value. In
' 9 fDexer v. Jackson, 245 Mass. 333, 140 N. E. 267 (1923).
5"'1 Supra note 9.
Ibid. at 502, 71 P. (2d) at 398.
52
Ibid.
-'Supranote 21.
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discussing a case in which the same problem had arisen under the 1917
statute,54 the court said of the exemption provision of that act:
"In any event, the proviso in the 1917 statute, as construed
in the Sherwood case, is fundamentally different from that in
the 1939 statute. By the 1917 proviso, the 'net value of any
estate', if passing to certain persons designated therein, was
entitled to an exemption of ten thousand dollars; that is,
the exemption applied directly to the estate itself, however
great or small it might be, and regardless of any other provisions in the statute ...
"The 1939 statute employs a wholly different formula.
Section 1 of that act ... [the rate section] is not primarily
concerned with the determination of the net amount of the
taxable estate, but, rather, with the division of the entire
estate into blocks by which the applicable rates of taxation
are to be determined. The denominator employed for that
purpose is 'the amount passing' to persons within class A.
Thus, the act first designates a series of blocks, or brackets,
to be determined by the amount passing to persons included in
that class; it then fixes the tax rates to be applied to the
respective blocks; and, finally ...it allows an exemption of
ten thousand dollars 'of any amount passing' to such persons...
"Always to be kept in mind is the fact that in neither
statute [the 1935 or the 1939 Act] is there provision for any
deduction from the 'net value of any estate'."55
This is a plain construction of the statute as an inheritance tax act,
an act in which the rate is fixed, not in terms of net taxable value of
the entire estate passing, from which exemption will be allowed on
the basis of consanguinity of transferor to transferee, but in which the
transferee himself is exempted from tax. For the statute expressly
provides,5" of course, that the grant to the class of which he is a
member, like the tax itself, must be apportioned according to the
interest of each beneficiary.
Must we not conclude, from analysis of the terms of the statute itself
and in the light of these cases, that provision for computing the tax
on the sum of the interests of all beneficiaries bearing a defined relationship to the transferor, instead of on the interest of each transferee,
separately considered, has not changed the exaction from succession
tax to death duty, but has only affected the amount each beneficiary
must pay for the privilege of receiving his legacy? We do not now
begin with the value of all property passing from the decedent, deducting therefrom such items as may be exempted from the taxable
estate by reason of consanguinity or beneficience of purpose. On the
contrary, we start at the other end-with the value of the taxable
11 In re Sherwood's Estate, supra note 9.

5 Supra note 21, at 375, 377, 107 P. (2d) at 566, 567. Italics in full sentences
8 supplied.
" WASH. LAws 1939, c. 202, § 1; REm. REv. STAT.

(Supp.

1939) § 11202.
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property passing to each beneficiary-adding thereto the value of the
taxable interests of all others whose relationship to the transferor is
in the same defined classification.
The effect of the addition may be a result which approximates that
reached where the tax is levied upon the estate-and very probably
this is what our court meant by its statement in In re Henry's Estate7
that the 1935 Act embodied features not only of a tax upon the right
of the heir to receive, but upon the estate. But resemblance to a true
death duty by reason of classification of heirs and combination of
their interests is apparent rather than real. There has been no fundamental shift in emphasis from receipt to transfer-from beneficiary
to estate. It is the sum total of the combined bequests, not the sum
total of decedent's property, upon which the rate is based; and to
effect the combination, we must still look to and separately consider
each beneficiary. We have here, do we not, an act which levies not
a death duty, but one which provides only an unusual method of calculiting a succession tax?
In terms of "A" of our problem then, we conclude that the State
of Washington imposes the tax upon the remainderman's legacy itself.
And, unless the state has considered the uncertainties of conditional
remainders in levying the tax upon such interests, it is the remainderman who will be called upon to pay from his own pocket a substantial sum for which he may actually receive nothing at allY8 There is
nothing in the bequest itself to satisfy the tax collector, and the uncertainties of eventual realization obviously make its sale or use as
collateral to meet the tax as hazardous to purchaser or prospective
lender as it is to the taxpayer himself.
Shifting emphasis momentarily from the taxpayer before going to
"B" of our problem, let us consider the effect of our conclusion upon
imposition of the tax by the state.
To impose its levy, the sovereign exacting an estate tax need establish only the value of all the property which is the subject of transfer
by decedent. If it authorizes deduction from the taxable value on the
basis of consanguinity, for example, the estate must bring itself within
the terms of the authorization by establishing that the heir. or distributee is one thus favored and that his bequest is in the amount which
the statute allows to be deducted. And if the interest concerned is a
remainder, it is the estate which must prove the remainderman's
identity and the quantum of his interest. Exemptions and deductions
are strictly construed.56
578 Supra note 19.

"For, irrespective of whether there is personal liability, levying under
the succession theory "has the effect of enforcing collection ... from the
devisees and legatees ... " In re Ferguson's Estate, supra note 27, at 60,
194 P. at 775.
"' In re Rothfeld's Estate, supra note 28; In re Lande's Estate, 241 App.
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. But if the state taxes on the basis of receipt by each beneficiary or
combination of beneficiaries and the rate itself varies with the degree
of consanguinity and the value of the interest, it is now the state which
must establish that a beneficial interest is received. It is the state
which must identify the heir or distributee and prove the quantum of
his interest, for manifestly the applicable rate must be determined
before any tax can be imposed. 0 And if the interest concerned is a
conditional remainder, the problem of proof may be acute indeed.
The state imposing a death duty can dispose of the predicament
inherent in the uncertainty of conditional remainder interests with
ease. It can say simply: "We tax the privilege of transferring property, and when we allow the transfer itself, the tax lies. Our rate is
based on the total value of all property transferred, and unless the
estate can prove that it is entitled to reduction in that value by reason
of an express exemption or deduction, the tax will remain fixed at that
rate. Nor will we indulge in any speculation as to the ultimate taker
of a remainder interest or how much he will eventually receive. Reduction in taxable value will not be granted on account of such interest
where it is contingent or conditional. To entitle the estate to an exemption, the interest must be certain or definitely ascertainable."
The federal government has said this often." So has the State of
New York, since it adopted an estate tax law patterned after the
federal act.62 The exemption is denied as well where the quantum
of the remainder interest cannot be determined as where the identity
Div. 138, 271 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1934); In re Smith's Estate, supra note 32.
60 In re Roosevelt's Estate, 143 N. Y. 120, 38 N. E. 281 (1894); Valentine's
Estate, 297 Pa. 99, 146 Atl. 453, 64 A. L. R. 737 (1929); 28 AM. JuR. 30. In re
Curtis' Estate. supra note 28, at 220, 36 N. E. at 888, the court holding that
a succession tax could not be imposed upon remainder interests where the
identity of the remainderman was not determinable at the time of decedent's
death, said: " . . . until the termination of the trusts it will be impossible
to know whether the remainders are in truth taxable or not. Prior to that
event, the state cannot establish that any beneficial interest will pass
to persons in whose hands it will be taxable; and, until it can show that vital
and necessary fact, its right to tax cannot arise ......
The court in In re Rothfeld's Estate. supra note 28, at 17. 296 N. Y. Supp.
at 324. speaking of the purpose and result of the change in the New York
law from succession levy to estate tax, said: "As the estate tax is one
which is imposed upon the privilege of the decedent to direct the devolution- of his assets on death, and not, as was the transfer tax, on the right
of the successor in interest to receive . . . it follows as a logical matter that,
prima facie, all property thus beneficially transmitted by the decedent is
subject to the specified impost, and this is the preliminary statement of
the law ....
"It may be observed parenthetically that this diversity of basis of
tax is of vital importance for recollection, since it alters the location of
burden of proof in many respects from its position under the Transfer Tax
Law. There, the tax, being imposed on the benefit received by the individual
recipient,made necessary a demonstrationby the taxing authority of the fact
and value of such benefit as a condition to its taxability." (Italics supplied)
6
U. S. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 83 F. (2d) 85 (C.C. A. 10th, 1936) cert. den.
299 U. S. 575 (1936); cf. U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272 (1934).
0'In re Leichtman's Estate, 147 Misc 589, 265 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1933);
In re Mead's Estate, 145 Misc. 893, 261 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1932).
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of the remainderman cannot be established until the eventuality
3
occurs.
But the state imposing a succession tax cannot dispose of the difficulties inherent in the uncertainty of conditional remainder interests
so easily. It must say: "We tax the privilege of receiving property,
and our rate is based on what is received and who receives it. Accordingly it must be shown in each instance that a beneficial interest
is in fact received, who the recipient is, and what he takes, before
the tax can be levied. That there is a beneficiary and the extent of
his interest must be certain or sufficiently ascertainable for the applicable rate to be determined and the toll exacted. And we bear the
burden of proof."
The matter is not one of denying an exemption to the estate on the
basis of uncertainty, but of imposing the tax.
Where future interests are involved, the most simple solution to the
problem is for the state to await the eventuality, postponing imposition of the tax until it can be determined who the beneficiary is and
the vdlue of his interest. In the early days of taxation on devolution,
this was the common method employed. 64 It is eminently fair to the
taxpayer, but from the point of view of the state it has two great disadvantages. It places the burden of depreciation of the property during
the preceding estate upon the state. It postpones for an indeterminate
period collection of the tax.
States formerly taxing upon this basis have for these reasons quite
generally either enactedL estate tax laws, or levied the tax before
termination of the precedent estate upon the theory that an interest
in property is transferred, or rather received, upon and by reason of
the death of the transferor, and therefore the receipt is taxable. 5 The
interest received is not the real interest but, in terms of our problem,
I
the conditional remainder itself.
Its power over property subject to inheritance being plenary, the
sovereign may, of course, make its own rules for prescribing the rate
and fixing the tax. The State of Washington has done so.66 But, having
established its impost as a levy upon receipt, the state taxing under
6
Del. Trust Co. v. Handy, 53 F. (2d) 1042 (D. Del. 1931); cf. Ithaca
Trust Co. v. U. S,. 279 U. S. 151 (1929); Humes v. U. S., supra note 29;
cf. U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., supra note 61.
61 Billings v.,People, 189 M. 472, 59 N. E. 798, 59 L. R. A. 807 (1901), affd.
188 U. S. 97 (1902); In re Cassidy, 122 Me. 33, 118 Atl. 725 (1922); In re
Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274, 30 N. E. 184, 14 L. R. A. 836 (1892); 28 Amr. JuR. 46.
05 In re Chollet's Estate, supra note 30; In re Smith's Estate, supra note
32; Salmon v. State Tax Comm., 278 U. S. 484 (1929); 30 A. L. R. 482; 28
Amz. Jun. 47.
Study of successive inheritance tax enactments by the State of Washington is illustrative of a. trend of legislative endeavor to impose and collect
the06
tax as speedily as possible.
In re Fotheringham's Estate, supra note 10; REmr. REv. STAT. (Supp
1939) § 11201 et seq.
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the succession theory must show that something is in fact received to
which its tax is applicable, for it cannot confiscate in the guise of
taxation. 67 The difficulties arise not in making the rules for determining who the ultimate taker will be and the value of his interest, but
in their application to the vast number of possible conditions, and
combinations of conditions upon which estates may be limited. Again,
if the state cannot establish identity of the beneficiary and the value
of his interest in accordance with its self-imposed burden, it cannot
impose the tax. The levies upon transfer of ownership from dead to
living being special taxes, they are strictly construed against the taxing
body."'
B. UPON WHAT EVALUATION Is THE TAX ON CONDITIONAL REMAINDERS PAYABLE?

Let us now examine the method and rules established by the State
of Washington for taxing conditional remainders, with particular reference to their evaluation.
Our pertinent statutes are as follows:
"When the estate of a deceased person shall be subject
to an inheritance tax, and there be an annuity, life estate or
an estate for a term of years given to one or more persons
and the remainder to another or others, the entire estate shall
be appraised as other estates are requried to be appraised by
the laws of this state. The value of the annuity, life or term
estate, shall be determined according to the rules or standards
of mortality and of value commonly used in actuaries' combined
experience tables on the basis of four per cent annual interest,
and the value of the remainder shall be determined by deducting the amount found to be the value of the annuity, life or
term estate from the whole estate. After the values shall have
been determined as provided in this section, the tax shall be
computed and collected in the same manner that the tax on
other estate is computed and collected. Provided, however, that
any person ...

owning the beneficial interest in the remainder

may defer the payment of the tax thereon until they come into
possession of the same by filing . . . within thirty days after

the determination of the tax, a . . . surety bond to the State
• . . in a sum equal to the amount of the tax conditioned
that they will pay such tax in full within sixty days after
coming into possession of the estate. Such bond shall not
operate to defer payment of the tax unless it is approved by
the supervisor, and if it shall appear to the supervisor at any
67 Dane v. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589 (1921); Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N. J. L. 608,
137 Atl. 552. 58 A. L. R. 137 ( 1927); In re Roosevelt's Estate, supra note 60.
Cf., under Estate Tax theory, In re Smith's Estate, In re Curtis' Estate, both
supra note 28.

" Walla Walla v. State, supra note 25; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S.
55 (1930); People v Continental Ill. Bank & Trust Co., 344 Ill. 123, 176 N. E.
305, 75 A. L. R. 538 (1931); cf. In re Sweek's Estate, 191 Wash. 660, 664, 71 P.
(2d) 657, 658, 113 A. L. R. 386, 388 (1937), where the court said: " . . . the

rule... should not be extended so far as to produce an undesirable result"
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time that a bond previously filed and approved has become
insufficient he may require a new bond to be filed. The State
Insurance Commissioner is hereby directed to obtain and publish for the use of courts and appraisers throughout the
state tables showing the average expectancy of life and values
of annuities and of life and term estate.69
"When property is transferred in trust or otherwise and
the rights, interests or estates of the transferees are dependent
upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly
or in part created, defeated, extended or abridge.d, such property shall be appraised at its clear market avalue immediately
upon the transfer or as soon thereafter as practicable and a
tax shall be imposed upon such transfer at the highest rate
which on the happening of any such contingencies or conditions would be probable under the provisions of this act
and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable in the
same manner as other taxes.
"Where an estate for life or for years can be divested by
be taxed
the act or omission of the legatee or devisee, it shall
M0
as if there were no possibility of such divesting."
It is evident from analysis of the first of these sections that no
difficulty will be experienced in imposing a tax upon a straight as
distinguished from a conditional remainder. All the state need establish
is the value of that part of decedent's property which is the subject
of divided interests. From that value it is easy to separate the life
tenant's estate, for example, from the remainder interest. The statute
prescribes a specific and reasonable method for so doing, viz. by determining the value of the precedent interest according to the rules
or standards of mortality and of value commonly used in actuaries'
combined experience tables on the basis of 4 per cent annual interest,
and de4ucting that figure from the value of the property itself.
The value of the remainder interest, though not known at the time
the transferor dies, can be ascertained, at least with no more uncertainty than generally attends human affairs. 7 To be sure, the life
tenant may die before the date fixed by the mortality tables. Or he
may outlive his expectancy. But this is surely the best substitute for
sitting out the eventuality. Since neither interest nor quantum of
interest in the property of this remainderman can change, he has no
just ground for complaint if the tax is imposed upon him at the
transferor's death and at a valuation so determined. Particularly can
he not be heard to complain in view of the fact that the statute pro'vides for postponement of payment of the tax so imposed until he
comes into the beneficial enjoyment of the property. For, although he
6

1W&siL LAWS 1939, c. 202, § 6;
70

Rim. REV..STAT.. (Supp. 1939) § 11205.

WAsm LAWs 1939, c. 202 § 7; REML REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11206.
Italics supplied.

71 Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S., supra note 64; First Nat. Bank v. Snead, 24 F.

(2d) 186 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); In re Smith's Estate, supra note 32.
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must pay a bond premium on an amount of tax based on the value
of his interest as so computed until termination of the preceding estate,
it is exceedingly unlikely that this cost will exceed or even equal his
eventual realization unless disaster overtakes the estate.
1. But the situation is vastly different where the remainder is vested
subject to open. Our example here was: T devises Blackacre to A for
life, renainder to the sons of A. B is A's only son at the date of T's
death. Looking to the terms of our statute, B's is an interest which
may be "in part abridged" by the birth of other male children to A
prior to the termination of his estate.
If B pays a tax on his interest measured by subtracting A's life
interest from the value of Blackacre, and additional sons are thereafter
born to A, not only will B have paid upon a valuation which has greatly
shrunk through factors having nothing to do with the value of the
property itself, but he will also have, paid what is, or rather has become
in fact, the debt of another or others, as the case may be; and the
statute makes provision neither for reimbursement from the state nor
from the after-born remaindermen.
If B defers payment by posting a bond conditioned on payment of
a tax determined on the basis that he is the sole remainderman, and
other sons are born to A, not only will B pay a premium on the entire
remainder interest while awaiting the calamity, but after it happens,
for there is no provision in the statute for adjustment of the bond
except upwards.
Does the statute necessarily require such result? The text is, in
substance, that where the transferee's interest is dependent upon conditions whereby it may be wholly or in part created, defeated, extended,
or abridged, the property shall be appraised at its clear market value
immediately upon the transfer or as soon thereafter as practicable and
a tax imposed upon the transfer at the highest rate which on the
happening of any such conditions would be probable, and the tax so
imposed shall be due and payable in the same manner as other taxes.
Assuming that the, "property" is the remainder interest, is it to be
appraised at its clear market value immediately upon T's death? Or
does the statute mean that because new interests may be "created"
by the birth of other sons to A, appraisal will be postponed until such
interests, if any, come into being, at which time only will it be
"practicable" to appraise them. Is this the intended method of evaluating this conditional remainder? Unless this is its meaning, the
answer to the question must be that the remainder is to be appraised
immediately upon the transfer, for at the time of T's death, B is certainly the transferee of the entire interest, and the value of Blackacre
and of the life tenant's interest in Blackacre are both then ascertainable
by the methods the statute provides.
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Therefore, if the "transfer" occurs for tax purposes when T dies
(a question which we shall later consider) it would seem that the
tax will be imposed at that time at the rate prescribed for inheritance
by persons bearing B's relationship to T, and on an evaluation determined by deducting A's life interest from the appraised value of Blackacre. There is no problem here of determining the relationship to the
transferor of possible beneficiaries other than B, for, of, course, any
sons afterwards born to A will bear the same relationship, and their
interests would therefore be taxed in the same rate classification as
B's. The question is solely one of ascertaining the amount of the interest which is subject to tax at T's death.
2. Let us pass on to consider, in the light of our statute, remainders
subject to a condition precedent. Our example here was: T devises
Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B if, but only if, B shall attain
the age of 21. This is an interest which is "created" by, and only by,
B's arrival at that age. Can such an interest be appraised.at itsclear
market value immediately upon the transfer, assuming again that
"property" means interest, and that the "transfer" takes place at -T's
death? If not, does the statute contemplate postponement of the appraisal and so the levy, until evaluation shall become practicable?.
If so, when is that time? Or does it intend that the same formula of
deducting A's life interest from the value of Blackacre shall be employed?
If B dies before he reaches 21, under the terms of this devise, the
heirs of the transferor or the residuary beneficiary Will take the remainder. We thus have another complication. For while B may be'
the son of T, for example, on B's death without issue, T's heirs or the
residuary beneficiary may be collateral, and the applicable rate .will
be higher. The statute attempts to meet this issue by providing that
the tax shall be imposei upon the transfer at the'highest rate Which,
on the happening of any of the conditions, would be probable., It is
not a matter here, of course, of the "happening" of the condition,
but of its failure to happen. But if this situation was intenfded to be
included in the scope of the provision, then ivhich is probable--that B
will live to be 21 and so take the remainder, or that he will. die and T's
heirs or the residuary beneficiary take? How can the issue be decided?
The statute provides no method. Nor can the problem be solved by
applying the highest rate, for the statute distinctly says "the highest
rate which, on the happening of any such . . . condition, would be
72
probable."
If the state cannot or does not await the eventuality, to levy -the
tax,. the only other solutions seem to be either to offer evidencb of:the
precarious condition of B's health, and so the likelihood of his early
72 Italics supplied.
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denise, or to accept a tax at the lowest rate, that is, on the basis that
B will in fact attain age 21 and so meet the condition.
3. Where the remainder vests but is subject to complete defeasance,
the problem under our statute is still different, though no less difficult.
Our example here was: T devises Blackacre to A for life, remainder
as A shall by will appoint, but in default of and until such appointment, to B. Can this estate be appraised at the date of T's death?
Or is again the same formula of deducting the value of A's life estate
from the value of Blackacre to be used to determine B's interest? If
not, there is no practicable time, during the life tenancy at which to
evaluate it. Until A dies it cannot be known whether B's estate will
be defeated. A may make a will exercising the power, but it is, of
course, ambulatory until his death.
And here again, what rate is to apply? A may exercise the power in
favor of persons 3 inheritance by whom is taxed at a higher rate than B.
Is it more probable that A will exercise the power than that he will not?
And if so in whose favor? What kind of proof can here be offered
to determine the applicable, rate and so fix the tax? If the state cannot or does not sit out the event, it would here appear that the only
solution is to accept a tax at the lowest rate.
In the foregoing discussion we have, not been unmindful of the fact
that the words of the statute pertaining to taxation of conditional interests are "such property shall be appraised at its clear market value
74
immediately upon the transfer or as soon thereafter as practicable.1
What property? The words immediately preceding are "When property
is transferred in trust or otherwise and the rights, interests or estates
of the transferees are dependent upon . . . conditions whereby they
may be wholly or in part created, defeated ... ." etc. Does this mean

the property which is the subject of the remainder interest? That is,
does it mean Blackacre? If so, we are certainly left with our formula
of evaluating the remainder interest by the statutory method of subtracting A's interest from the value of Blackacre, or we have no
method at all.
But when T dies the "property" received by B is not Blackacre,
but a remaindex interest in Blackacre. And since the statute pertaining to the evaluation and appraisal of real property of a decedent's
estate provides for its appraisal at the lair market value on the day
of his death,"5 there is some reason at least to suppose, by reason of
the difference in wording, and particularly since the section relating
to conditional interests provides for appraisal of the property upon
"This
3
state, like many others, taxes exercise of a power of appointment

in the estate of the donee, except where, at the time the appointment is
effective, the donee is a non-resident. WASH. LAWS 1931, c. 134, § 2; REM.
REV. STAT. § 11201-c.

1

Italics supplied.

"WASH.

LAWS

1939, c. 202 § 10; REm. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11211-a.
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the transfer or as soon thereafter as practicable, that the legislature
meant an appraisal or evaluation of the remainder interest as distinguished from the property itself; and intended that such appraisal
should be postponed until there was some reasonable method of determining its "clear market value". For obviously the statutory formula of the preceding section is arbitrary in the extreme in any of
the examples of conditional remainders we have cited.
This becomes thoroughly apparent when we consider the second
hypothetical under remainders subject to complete defeasance. Our
example there was: T devises Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B,
but with power in A to dispose of the property and use the principal for
support during his lifetime. For here, A's interest is surely something
greater than an ordinary life tenancy, for all practical purposes at least.
True, his use of the principal is restricted to what is reasonably necessary to his support, that is, he may not indulge in riotous living at
the expense of the remainder interest.76 Neverthele's, he may exhaust
the corpus if need be. Can such an estate be measured by mortality
and actuaries' experience tables commonly in use? Where are they to
be found? And if there are no such tables in common or uncommon
usage, what does one use for a subtrahend in determining the value
of the remainder limited after this kind of precedent estate?
The statute has established only one formula, unless by the words
"appraisal of the property" in the succeeding section, is meant evaluation of the conditional remainder interest, and unless the language
of this section contemplates such evaluation at such time and by such
means as may be or become "practicable". If such is the meaning,
then it is perhaps possible for the state at the time of T's death to
show with reasonable certainty that there will be no invasion of principal for support, by proof that the income is adequate for the life
tenant to maintain himself in his accustomed manner, or that he has
income from other sources upon which he can draw,7 7 and thus to
establish the value of the remainder interest with some degree of
accuracy.
But where the power in the life tenant to invade the corpus is unrestricted as to purpose,, that is, where he can use the principal for
any purpose he deems fit, can the value of the remainder at T's death
"I6n re Dorgan's Estate, 237 Fed. 507 (S. D. Iowa 1916); Camden Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Com'r. Int. Rev. 30 B. T. A. 287 (1934).
7,Millard v.Humphrey, 8 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. N. Y. 1934); Lucas v.
Merc. Trust Co., 43 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); Sanderson v. Com'r. Int.
Rev., 18 B. T. A. 221 (1929). These cases involve deductibility from estate
tax where the power is limited to support and maintenance, but the same
principle would be applicable where the state had the burden.
A most excellent discussion of evaluation and taxation of uncertain
interests under both death duty and succession theories, with particular
reference to the burden of proof, is contained in In re Rothfeld's Estate,
supra note 28.
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be determined by any kind of evidence? In this case the statutory
formula is not only arbitrary, but thoroughly absurd. Here there does
not appear to be any reasonable solution, except for the state to await
determination of what amount of the property, if any, will remain
when the life tenant dies.
Once more, the statute does 'not authorize levy of the tax at the
highest possible rate, but on the highest possible rate which on the
happening of any of the conditions would be probable. And assuming
the power in A to be a further condition on B's estate, who can determine in so absolute a grant what the probabilities are? The state
can classify the beneficiary here and in the preceding example, in
accordance with his relationship to the transferor, but how can the
other rate variable be determined?
And if the tax cannot be, determined because the applicable rate cannot be fixed, in what amount shall a bond be exacted as a condition
to deferring payment? Here again the statute provides only one answer
-- "in a sum equal to the amount of the tax"."M
Most of these questions can only be posed-they can not be answered. But our Supreme Court has passed upon some of them-and
in those decisions are indicated the probable answer to many others.
We turn therefore to consideration of the case law of the state:
In In re Phillips' Estate79 the court had before it a will providing that
the income of the trust created should go to a brother, two sisters,
and two nieces of decedent until death of survivor of brothers and
sisters, then to terminate and be distributed to the nieces or their
surviving issue, but if no issue then to survivors of brother, sisters,
and nieces as if they had not been named -in the instrument. The
state claimed the tax should be levied as if the estate passed to one
brother, sister, or niece; the executor contended that the value of each
life estate and remainder should be separately computed and taxed,
and that the tax on the remainder should be calculated as if it were
certain to vest in the nieces.
The statute then in effect, like our present law, carried no method
for evaluating remainder estates, other than deduction of the life
tenant's interest as computed by mortality and actuaries' experience
tables, from the value of the property itself. It also contained our
present provision for appraising the "property" conditionally transferred at its clear market value immediately upon the transfer or as
soon thereafter as practicable. But it provide4I for taxation of conditional interests at the "lowest rate possible," with recoupment by the
state if, when the condition happened, it was found a higher rate
should have been applied.
i1The reader is also invited to consider the probable premium costs in
view of the uncertainty that the principal will ever realize anything.
71133 Wash. 41, 233 Pac. 27 (1925).
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The court,' upholding the executor in both contentions, (1) did not
even question when the transfer of the conditional interest took place
for the purpose of imposing the tax-it was assumed the date of
decedent's death governed here as in the case of other interests; and
(2) assumed that appraisal of. the "property" meant the property
itself which is the subject of the divided interests, not evaluation of
the remainder; and (3) decided that the method of determining the
value, of conditional remainder was the same as that provided for
evaluating straight or indefeasibly vested remainders, that is, by subtracting the life estate value from that 'of the property. It said so
flatly.
Here of course the court was not confronted with a case in which
the subtrahend of the statutory formula, the value of the life tenancy,
cannot possibly be ascertained by resort to mortality and actuaries'
experience tables. The question was not evaluation of the remainderman's interest. Nor was there any real problem of ascertainment of
identity of the remainderman. Since at all events the state could, only
levy the least possible tax at the time the transferor died, there was no
need to look beyond the instrument itself to-determine the beneficiary
who would take the lowest*rate. Nor was there -need to consider when
and by what method the statute contemplated conditional remainders
should be evaluated, nor what time it fixed as the date of "transfer"
of such interests for the purpose of imposing the tax.
Seven years later, and under a statute which now taxed conditional
estates at the "highest rate probable" with provision for refund to the
taxpayer on the happening of the contingency under certain procedure,
the court decided In re Eaton's Estate.80 There the residuary went to
a son and daughter, but if both died before twenty-one, unmarried and
without issue, then dece.dent's sister or her heirs were the beneficiaries.
The state claimed the rate for collateral heirs was applicable because
of the contingency-the executor contended that the estate was taxable
to lineals.
Under the wording of the new statute, it was now necessary to
identify the probable beneficiary in order to determine the applicable
rate. The statute then as now provided no method for doing so. But
the court, again assuming the effective date of "transfer" of such
interests was when decedent died, determined the question by consideration of the relative ages of all possible beneficiaries. It did not
discuss the theory of the tax nor the burden of proof, but since the
lineal heirs were children and the collaterals adults there was little
'doubt as to the probable ultimate taker.
In interpreting the statute to mean that the identity of the benea' 170 Wash. 280, 16 P. (2d) 433 (1932). A similar problem was raised
and a like result reached in In re Waterman's Estate, 173 Wash. 101, 22 P.
(2d) 53 (1933).
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ficiary should be determined and the applicable, rate thus fixed by
extrinsic evidence, the court adopted the only possible constructionand the one the legislature obviously intended. But when it has been
confronted with the problem of how, under the wording "the highest
rate probable," the other rate variable-the, value of the conditional
remainder interest-shall be determined, the court has held that the
statutory formula of deducting the value of the life. tenancy from the
value of the property was intended as blanket coverage for all remainders.
The rule of the Phillips' Estate case 8' is still the law, even though
that doctrine was established under a statute which provided that the
state must tax at the lowest rate which upon the happening of any
of the contingencies would be possible. A remainder interest following
a life estate with unlimited power in the life tenant to exhaust the
corpus is now valued and the applicable tax rate determined as if
the power did not exist. This is not the highest rate probable, but the
highest rate, possible! How this can be reconciled with the emphatic
statement in the Eaton Estate case that probable does not mean
possible,82 it is difficult to see.
In In re Daub's Estate,8 3 the will left a community estate to a surviving spouse with power in him to sell and convert the property for
his own purposes to any amount "he shall determine to be necessary
and proper," and upon his death the residue, if any, to go to testatrix's
brother and nephew. The court held the trial judge erred in ruling
that since the husband's interest was greater than a life estate, the
inheritance tax should be paid as if he took in fee, leaving the tax
upon the remainderman to be imposed when, at T's death, it was
known what amount they would take. It said the tax should have
been paid on the widower's interest as a life estate and an immediate
tax imposed upon the remainders according to the, statutory formula.
There was no discussion in the case of the effect of the power of invasion on the taxable value of the remainder interests. The real value
was known, however, at the time the issue arose, for the life tenant
had died and the corpus had passed intact to the. remaindermen.
The testatrix in In re Gochnour's EstateS4 left her property to her
husband with "full power to alienate the same for his use and benefit,"
remainder over of "the proceeds thereof remaining" to her nieces and
sisters. The question of this case was not at what evaluation the tax
on either life estate or remainder interests was to be imposed, but
whether in view of the statutory $10,000 exemption to Class A beneficiaries, any tax was payable at all. The estate was in a lesser amount
S1 Supra note 79.
11 "The word 'probable' implies a far different meaning than the word
'possible'." Supra note 80, at 285, 16 P. (2d) at 435.
11190 Wash. 420, 68 P. (2d) 610 (1937).
8, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937).
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than the exemption. It was not necessary therefore to determine the
method of taxing either life tenancy or remainder interests, if the full
amount of the exemption applied.
The court, however, again discussed taxation of such interests without questioning application of the statutory formula.
But in In re Bolstad's Estate,5 the estate exceeded in value the
amount of the statutory exemption, and the problem of taxing the
divided interests was therefore present. The bequest here was in
trust for an incompetent son with power in the trustee to use the
"principal and income for the care and maintenance of the cestui,"
remainder over to Class C beneficiaries. The trial court had held the
entire estate passed for the use of the son by reason of the power to
invade, and was therefore taxable as a bequest to lineals. The appellate
court classified the bequest for tax purposes as one of divided interests
and held that an immediate tax was imposable on the remainders "on
the value of the estate in excess of ten thousand dollars" (the statutory
exemption applicable to the life beneficiary). Again the court did not
question the rationality of applying the statutory formula for evaluating
divided interests to this type of bequest.
And in In re Ivy's Estate,8 the court, disposing of the same kind
of problem, where at the time the case was decided it was unknown
how much of the corpus would be withdrawn said: "our inheritance
87
tax statute and our opinions ... foreclose the question".
These cases, of course, deal primarily with taxation of the interest
upon which the power is engrafted-that is, whether the preceding
estate is taxable as a life tenancy or a fee. But with this the question
of taxing the remainder is inextricably interbound, for if the precedent
estate is taxed as a fee it necessarily follows that imposition of a tax
on the subsequent interests will await determination of what they
receive, that is, what portion of the estate remains unconsumed. Such
decision would solve, our problem, and in fajlure to so hold, the court
in effect is applying the statutory formula to ascertainment of the
remainderman's interest. Mortality and actuaries' experience tables
are apparently the measuring stick for all technical life estates, and
the figure resulting from their use is the subtrahend to evaluate the
remainder in all cases.
Courts passing upon exemptions claimed in favor of remainder
interests on the ground of consanguity or beneficence of purpose have
denied them where the life tenant has unrestricted power to invade
the principal. In such case it is said the amount of the remainder
interest is too uncertain for the estate to establish its right to deduc85200 Wash. 30, 93 P. (2d) 726 (1939).
984 Wn. (2d) 1, 101 P. (2d) 1074 (1940).
s, Ibid. at 8, 101 P. (2d) at 1077.
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tion.88
In fact, deductions are, as one court said, only allowable where
the interests concerned "can be made definite and certain as of the date
of the testator's death either by appraisal of the principal or fee
interests then indefeasibly vesting, or by computation of similarly
vesting interests in usufruct only, made according to the tables of
mortality which the statute authorizes the state superintendent of
insurance to use for the. purpose."8 Our own court has denied an
exemption to a charitable institution on the ground that the bequest
was so conditioned as to make the amount uncertain."
If an exemption will not be allowed because, actuaries' tables will
not calculate the value of the precedent interest and so provide a
means of ascertaining the remainder, how can a sovereign who bears
the burden, by reason of the theory of its levy, of establishing that
a beneficial interest is received, the amount, and the.transferee thereof,
impose a tax on such basis?

Our court has never answered this question. It has never discussed
a power to invade a corpus in terms of its effect upon the real value
of either precedent or subsequent interests with reference to taxation.
To all queries as to application of the statutory formula, it has had
a standard reply-that, according to the law of property, an interest
otherwise a life tenancy upon which is engrafted a power to invade
the principal, limited or unlimited, is still a life estate and the subsequent interest is a "vested remainder". And this is true. 91 But it is
88 Davis v. Com'r. Int. Rev., 81 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); In re Mead's
Estate. supra note 62; In re Bonner's Estate, 157 Misc. 810, 285 N. Y. Supp.
283 (1936). In the last preceding case the interest was held not deductible
because uncertain, although the power in the trustees to invade was
limited to the support of the life cestui. Cf. Blood v. Com'r. Int. Rev., 22
B. T. A. 1000 (1931): same result where the nower was limited in terms
to maintenance of wife, but broadly discretionary in the trustee, and no
proof offered negativing probability of invasion.

"OIn re Smith's Estate, supra note 32; Edwards v. Slocum, supra note

23, at 654: "Algebraic formulae are not lightly to be imputed to legislators."
Justice Brandeis expressed the matter very succinctly in Humes v. U. S.,
supra note 29, at 494: "One may guess or gamble on or even insure against
any future event. The solicitor general tells us that Lloyds of London will
insure against having twins. But the fundamental question in the case at
bar is not whether this contingent interest can be insured against or its
value guessed at, but what construction shall be given a statute. Did
Congress, in providing for the determination of the net estate taxable,
intend that a deduction should be made for a contingency the actual value
of which cannot be detemined from any known data? Neither taxpayer nor
revenue officer-even if equipped with all the aid which the actuarial art
can supply-could do more than guess at the value of this contingency.
It is clear that Congress did not intend that a deduction should be made
for a contingent gift of that character."
90 In re Duncan's Estate, 113 Wash. 165, 193 Pac. 694 (1920).
91 The remainder is technically vested subject to defeasance, rather than
being subject to the condition precedent of its non-exercise. RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936)
§ 276. The Washington court early recognized, however,
that the precedent interest was greater than a life tenancy, even where
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an answer which'answers nothing.
For we are not dealing with property law except incidentally. Certainly we are not dealing with the ancient though admirable fictions
of the common law. We are dealing with something very modern, and
unfortunately very real-the taxation of inheritance. The legatee
upon whom a tax is imposed is not interested, when called upon to
pay it, in the technical definition of his interest. He is concerned, and
vitally concerned, in what he receives in terms of real value. If he
may receive nothing at all, he does not care whether his so-called.
estate is truly contingent, or, vested subject to defeasance. For the
state to tax upon such technicalities seems frankly ridiculous.
Many courts have taken this view.92 Thus in Tyler v. U. S.,11 a leading tax case, the court was urged to hold that the property of a deceased
tenant by the entirety was not taxable because according to common
law theory death did not pass the decedent's interest to the survivor.
The answer was most emphatic that the exercise of the power to tax
"must be determined by the actual results brought about by the death
rather than by a consideration of the artificial rules which delimit
the title, rights, and powers of tenants by the entirety".
Although the federal courts in considering deductions have given
some attention to the question of whether the gift or bequest was
subject to a condition precedent or was subject to be divested,94 it has
generally been said that deductibility did not depend on the technical
nature of the estate created, but on whether the conditions rendered
it so uncertain that it could be said to have no ascertainable value. 95
the power was limited to maintenance and support. Porter v. Wheeler, 131
Wash. 482, 486, 230 Pac. 640, 642 (1924). This case did not involve taxation
of either interest, but whether the power carried the right of testamentary
disposition. It was held that it did not; the court did not define the extent
or limitations of the power except for the. question before it. Its words
were: "We shall not attempt to give to this estate so vested in (the widow)
any technical name. It seems to be something more than an ordinary conventional life estate ....

I - Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 476, (C.C. A. 4th, 1930), 107 A. L. R.
802; Davison v. Com'r. Int. Rev., supra note 88; Pennsylvania Co. v. Brown,
6 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Penn. 1923), aff'd. 70 F. (2d) 269, (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
In Lord v. Roberts, 84 N. H. 517, 525, 153 At. 1, 5 (1931), the court said:
"One having full title is not much more than a life tenant with power to
dispose of the remainder. The value of the remainderman's property interest is lessened by the value of the power, and a life tenant with unrestricted power has about as much in value as the owner of the full title.
An owner's right to dispose of an interest in remainder gives the ownership its chief value during the continuance of the antecedent estates."
93281 U. S. 497, 503 (1930). The court's expression is most apt: "Taxation,
as it many times has been said, is eminently practical, and a lractical mind,
considering results, would have some difficulty in accepting the conclusion
that the death of one of the tenants in each of these cases did not have
the effect of passing to the survivor substantial rights, in respect of the
property,
theretofore never enjoyed by such survivor."
0
1U. S. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, supra note 61.
95107 A. L. R.801, 802.
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Conversely, it is not the technical nature of the estate created which
permits a levy upon succession, but whether it has an ascertainable
value-whether the beneficiary receives anything upon which a tax
can be calculated.
As one court rather aptly put it: "If . . . technical vesting be
admitted, what so passed was rather a theoretical possibility than a
tangible reality,... the nominal and technical fee might never become
a taxable estate. It was never intended by the law to tax a theory
having no real substance behind it . ..the question of taxation is one
of fact and cannot turn on theories or fictions .... "
But if our court's solution to this problexn seems highly technical
and its answer quite unrelated to the facts, what other shall be given
under the terms of the statute by which it is governed? Taxation is a
fundamental and imperious necessity of all government, not to be
lightly deniedY7 Shall the state be left high and dry with its burden of
proving the value of the remainder, with no means of doing so? For
it does appear that the. legislature has provided only one method of
evaluating life estates and remainder interests. What shall the court do?
Will the statute bear the construction that conditional remainder
interests, as distinguished from the property subject thereto, shall
be appraised upon the transfer or as soon thereafter as practicable,
thus abating the tax by postponing their evaluation until there is some
reasonable means of doing so-even if it may not be practicable during
the preceding estate at all? Possibly, but this is doubtful, as the court
has already indicated.98 Can the state simply sit out the eventuality?
The court decided in In re Munson's Estate9 0 that it could not; and
the history of our inheritance tax legislation would seem clearly to
demonstrate a legislative purpose to exact the state's due as speedily
as possible.
But where the statutory formula cannot possibly evaluate the
remainder interest-where to apply it is to indulge in legal logistics
at the expense of all rationality, and to achieve a result which is so
arbitrary as to be in fact confiscatory-perhaps there is a better answer
than the court has given.
Might it not there say that the, law has provided only a method
which cannot be applied; and that since the state taxes inheritance
and must therefore establish the value of that inheritance, it may
introduce evidence, to prove that value-the same means the court
approved to determine the identity of the probable ultimate beneficiary?' 00 This would serve in those instances, for example, in which the
"In re Curtis' Estate, supra note 28. Italics supplied.
Tyler v. U. S., supra note 93.
In re Phillips' Estate, supra note 79.
9'189 Wash. 537, 66 P. (2d) 293 (1937).
"I0In re Eaton's Estate, supra note 80.
'7
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power to invade is limited to the support and maintenance of the life
tenant, for there one could determine with at least some degree of"
accuracy how much of the principal might be consumed.' 0 '
Of course, this would still leave unsolved.-those cases -where the
power to invade is unlimited as to purpose. The transferee of such
an "estate" is the remainderman of a mere: chance the life tenant willnot exercise the absolute power granted him. What extrinsic evidence
would establish the value of such an interest? But is not the answer
in these cases that while there may be a technical "transfer" 02 at
the time of the transferor's death, there is no taxable transfer, because
there is no ascertainable value at all, unless we are now to establish
value by the wildest of speculation. Imposition of the tax must be postponed of sheer necessity, for it cannot be levied until the rate is fixed,
and that in turn cannot be done until the value of the interest can
be determined.
We come back to this-either the statutory formula must be willynilly applied, or in many cases the state cannot impose the tax for
the duration of the antecedent estate. Our court has chosen the. first
horn of the dilemma, and we must therefore conclude in terms of "B"
of our problem, that all remainders, straight or conditional, and however conditioned, are taxed by the State of Washington at a valuation
determined as of decedent's death by deducting from the value of the
property, the value of the preceding interest measured according to
the standards of mortality and actuaries' combined experience tables
on the basis of four per cent annual interest. We must further conclude
that such tax is due and payable as the tax upon all other interests,
unless its payment is deferred by posting a bond in the sum of, and
conditioned to pay the tax as so fixed within sixty days after the
remainderman comes into possession-of anything.'
The dilemma remains inherent in the statute nonetheless. And this is
only one of many others which will continue to plague court and taxpayer alike so long as the inheritance tax statutes of this state continue
a heterogeneity of law copied from this and that jurisdiction, combined
with the session-to-session efforts of our own lawmakers to patch up
1 In Sanderson v. Com'r. int. Rev., 18 B. T. A. 221 (1929), for example,
the court considered the age and spending habits of the annuitant. Other
factors are the size of the income, and other revenue which may be available to the life tenant.
102 In this connection, it is interesting to observe that the Washington
court lately decided in In re McCallaugh's Estate, 193 Wash. 145, 151 74 P.
(2d) 877, 880 (1938), that in granting exemption of property "transferred"
within a year (now five years: WASH. LAws 1939, c. 202 § 2; ba'R. REv. STAT.
(Supp. 1939) § 11202-a), the legislature did not intend that no more than
a year could elapse between the date of the two deaths, but that the year
should begin to run from the date the property was distributed to and
"received" by the transferee. The court said, somewhat significantly: "The
tract that title to the ,property may vest at a particular time is not
material...."
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the most obviously weak of its very weak spots.
In terms of our own problem, the legislature should make up its
mind whether it wishes to ignore, the beneficiary entirely and tax the
estate, or whether it does not. And if it does not, then surely there
is some feasible method of imposing the tax on conditional remainders
which will not result in such glaring inequities as the foregoing discussion has shown to exist under the Act as it is presently drafted.

